[Mimedefang] Privilege escalation via PID file manipulation
michael at orlitzky.com
Thu Aug 31 10:08:46 EDT 2017
== Summary ==
The MIMEDefang daemons should create their PID files before dropping
privileges. This represents a minor security issue; additional factors
are needed to make it exploitable.
== Details ==
The purpose of the PID file is to hold the PID of the running daemon,
so that later it can be stopped, restarted, or otherwise signalled
(many daemons reload their configurations in response to a SIGHUP).
To fulfil that purpose, the contents of the PID file need to be
trustworthy. If the PID file is writable by a non-root user, then he
can replace its contents with the PID of a root process. Afterwards,
any attempt to signal the PID contained in the PID file will instead
signal a root process chosen by the non-root user (a vulnerability).
This is commonly exploitable through init scripts that are run as root
and which blindly trust the contents of their PID files. Examples of
said init scripts can be found in the MIMEDefang source tree:
== Exploitation ==
An example of a problematic scenario involving an init script would be,
1. I run "/etc/init.d/mimedefang start" to start the daemon.
2. mimedefang drops to the "defang" user.
3. mimedefang writes its PID file, now owned by the "defang" user.
4. Someone compromises the daemon.
5. The attacker is generally limited in what he can do because the
daemon doesn't run as root. However, he can write "1" into the
PID file, and he does.
6. I run "/etc/init.d/mimedefang stop" to stop the daemon while I
investigate the weird behavior resulting from the hack.
7. The machine reboots, because I killed PID 1 (this is normally
restricted to root).
== Resolution ==
The problem is usually avoided by creating the PID file as root, before
More information about the MIMEDefang